Trump should build on the momentum with Syria and help prevent a Turkey-Israel clash

Two recent developments present the new Syrian government with a critical opportunity to stabilize the country. First, US President Donald Trump, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, announced plans to lift sanctions on Syria, opening the door to much-needed investment for reconstruction. Second, the Kurdish militant group Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared it would disband and dissolve itself, bringing an end to its four-decade-long insurgency. The move by the PKK will help Damascus to finalize a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a military coalition led by a group that Turkey views as the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, and integrate it into the new Syrian national army. President Trump should build on this momentum and seize the opportunity to address one of the most complex remaining challenges facing Syria: the risk of a military confrontation between Turkey and Israel inside the country.

Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Israel has dramatically escalated its military activity in Syria — seizing the UN-monitored buffer zone, launching systematic strikes on air defenses and military infrastructure, and building new outposts. A central focus of Israeli operations is Turkey’s growing role in Syria. Israeli officials increasingly view Ankara’s presence as a greater threat than Iran, and have targeted airbases Turkey aimed to control. But the narrative casting Turkey as an ideological and military threat to Israel misreads Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s intent. Far from seeking confrontation, he sees post-Assad Syria as a strategic opportunity to resolve deep domestic and regional challenges. Escalating tensions with Israel would only undercut those ambitions.

Post-Assad Syria is Erdoğan’s chance for a reset at home and abroad

Post-Assad Syria presents Erdoğan with a rare chance to tackle several domestic challenges ahead of his expected 2028 re-election bid. The Turkish leader’s support at home has been slipping, and one of his biggest political liabilities is the presence of millions of Syrian refugees, which has fueled nationalist backlash and contributed to his party’s defeat in the 2019 municipal elections. With Assad gone, Erdoğan hopes conditions will soon allow for refugee repatriation — a move that could defuse a major source of public anger.

But their return depends on rebuilding Syria, and that opens up another opportunity. Turkey’s struggling economy has hit its construction sector, long a vehicle for patronage and source of political support for Erdoğan, hard. His allies in the sector are now eyeing lucrative reconstruction contracts across the border — and backing Erdoğan’s push for Western sanctions relief and international funding to flow into post-war Syria.

Erdoğan is also seeking Kurdish support for his 2028 run — a prospect greatly aided by the PKK’s May 12 announcement that it would disband and renounce armed conflict as part of a new peace initiative with Turkey. The process is closely tied to Syria and negotiations between the SDF and the new government in Damascus as well. The two sides signed an agreement in March, but key details still need to be resolved, like how the SDF will be merged into the Syrian army. The PKK’s announcement will give the ongoing talks on implementation a boost, furthering Erdoğan’s domestic political strategy, but there are still plenty of potential potholes on the road to a lasting Syrian-Kurdish settlement.

Post-Assad Syria also gives Erdoğan a chance to resolve one of his thorniest foreign policy challenges: repairing ties with Washington. US-Turkey relations have been badly strained — first by the Obama administration’s 2014 decision to arm PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish forces to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) in Kobane, and later by Erdoğan’s purchase of Russian-made S-400s missile defense systems, which triggered Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions and Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 fighter program. Now, Erdoğan sees Syria’s new landscape as an opportunity for a reset — an opening to realign with the Trump administration and push for Turkey’s return to the F-35 project.

Ankara is betting that if the new Syrian government maintains stability, implements the agreement to integrate the SDF into the national army, and keeps up pressure on ISIS, President Trump will pull US troops from Syria — ending support for the SDF and removing a key source of friction in US-Turkey ties. Erdoğan is also betting that a reset in bilateral relations will open the door to deeper defense cooperation with the US.

Erdogan needs a deal — not another war

To achieve his domestic and foreign policy objectives, Erdoğan needs a stable Syria governed by a moderate, inclusive administration capable of attracting international funding. But both Western and Gulf capitals remain wary of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s jihadi background and doubt that Erdoğan — himself an increasingly authoritarian leader — can serve as a moderating force over Syria’s new government. Skepticism about Turkey’s role is understandable. Ankara once fueled the Syrian conflict by backing radical Islamist factions and pursuing an ideological agenda aimed at regional dominance — a policy that not only failed but left Turkey isolated and burdened with millions of refugees.

That failure, compounded by economic strain, forced Erdoğan to recalibrate. He abandoned his pro-Islamist, revisionist regional posture in favor of pragmatic diplomacy focused on restoring ties with Middle Eastern powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. After years of tension, Erdoğan mended fences to unlock economic cooperation and is now pursuing deeper partnerships.

This pragmatic turn is also shaping Ankara’s posture in Syria. Ankara knows the new government in Damascus must avoid appearing beholden to Turkey — an image that would raise alarm in both regional and Western capitals. In a symbolic move, Sharaa chose Riyadh — not Ankara — for his first foreign visit, underscoring the message that post-Assad Syria will not be a Turkish client state.

Israeli officials, however, increasingly frame Turkey’s presence in Syria as a military and ideological threat, pointing to interim President Sharaa’s jihadist past and his ties to Erdoğan to justify continued operations. But this portrayal misrepresents the actual balance of power. In reality, Turkish officials privately express frustration over their limited influence in Damascus, noting that despite Ankara’s efforts to secure control of military bases, Damascus has pushed back. Sharaa is fully aware that heavy Turkish military involvement could hinder his efforts to build regional relationships. Damascus has signaled a clear interest in avoiding confrontation with Israel, and Sharaa has gone out of his way to ease Israeli concerns — proposing normalization, a demilitarized zone, and even allowing Israel to maintain a security presence near the Golan Heights.

Likewise, Turkish officials have made it clear they are not seeking a confrontation with Israel in Syria. While Turkey aims to solidify its influence next door, it knows it can no longer afford the ideological adventurism of its past, nor risk a military clash with Israel that could alienate the Gulf and Western powers it depends on both to rebuild Syria and to stabilize its own faltering economy. Regional efforts are underway between Syria and Israel, and between Israel and Turkey, to establish deconfliction mechanisms and build trust. But these talks need a push — and President Trump is the only leader with real leverage over Netanyahu. He must use it to make clear to Israeli officials that Turkey’s presence in Syria is not a threat but a potential asset for stabilizing the country, containing Iran, and preventing an ISIS resurgence — all outcomes that align with Israel’s own security interests.

 

Gönül Tol is Senior Fellow at MEI and the author of Erdogan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria.

Photo by Bandar Al-Jaloud/Saudi Royal Court/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images